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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the relationships between citizens’ populist attitudes, 
perceptions of public opinion and perceptions of mainstream news media. Relying on social 
identity theory as an explanatory framework, this paper argues that populist citizens assume 
that public opinion is congruent with their own opinion and that mainstream media reporting 
is hostile toward their own views. To date, only anecdotal evidence suggests that both as-
sumptions are true. The relationships are investigated in a cross-sectional survey with samples 
drawn from four Western European countries (N = 3,354). Multi-group regression analysis 
supports our hypotheses: False consensus and hostile media perceptions can clearly be linked 
to populist attitudes in all four regions under investigation. Moreover, our findings show a 
gap between hostile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions, which in-
creases with increasing populist attitudes to the point that the persuasive press inference 
mechanism is annulled.  
 Keywords: populist attitudes, populism, hostile media perceptions, false consensus, 
social identity theory 
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We Are the People and You Are Fake News: A Social Identity Approach  
to Populist Citizens’ False Consensus and Hostile Media Perceptions 
Various European and U.S. elections of the past decade illustrate a rather great de-
mand for populism at the citizen level. Populist parties gain a notable share of the vote in 
many Western countries, and their potential influence on liberal democracy is intensively dis-
cussed (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012; Waisbord, 2018). These developments are paralleled by 
an increase in research devoted to populist attitudes, which reflect the support for populism 
on the individual level (Schulz et al., 2017). With the general aim to learn more about those 
who potentially vote for populist parties, studies have collected information on populist citi-
zens’ sociodemographics, general attitudes, and voting preferences (e.g., Akkerman, Mudde, 
& Zaslove, 2014; Rooduijn, 2017; Schulz et al., 2017; van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2017), as 
well as about their personality (Bakker, Rooduijn, & Schumacher, 2016), their media prefer-
ences (Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017b) and specific psychological dispositions (Elchardus 
& Spruyt, 2016; Steenvoorden & Harteveld, 2017). However, quite a lot remains unknown 
regarding the question of what unites populist voters, especially because most studies are sin-
gle-country studies that focus on either left- or right-wing populism only (Rooduijn, 2017). 
Therefore, it is difficult to deduce comprehensive conclusions about the general character of 
populist citizens.  
However, anecdotal evidence points to as yet unstudied characteristics that populist 
citizens may share. Specifically, news reports about populist politicians and populist citizens 
suggest that hostile media perceptions and false consensus beliefs could unify those who sup-
port populist ideas. For example, media reports document chants of “We are the people” at 
demonstrations for populist movements as well as attacks against the media by populist actors 
or their followers, calling them fake news or system media (e.g., Jamieson, 2017; So-
maskanda, 2017). Additionally, theoretical work speaks to the possible importance of anti-
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media rhetoric (Krämer, forthcoming) and opinion majority claims (Taggart, 2000) for popu-
lism at the communicator level. In combination with the observations captured within anecdo-
tal evidence, these theoretical accounts motivate the assumption that populism, hostile media 
perceptions, and false consensus beliefs can also be connected at the citizen level.  
This article therefore focuses on the following three research questions. First, are hos-
tile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perception constant companions of popu-
list attitudes, or does anecdotal evidence distort the impression of the populist conception of 
these entities? Second, if these relations are systematic, do they also travel across country 
borders? Third, how can theory account for a co-occurrence of populist attitudes, hostile me-
dia perceptions and false consensus beliefs? This article is devoted to developing responses to 
all three questions. While the last question will be addressed on a theoretical level, the first 
and second question will undergo empirical testing.  
To find a theoretical explanation for the posited relationships between populist atti-
tudes, congruent public opinion beliefs, and hostile media perceptions, this article builds on a 
social identity approach to populist attitudes. Specifically, we will discuss the proposed rela-
tions as consequences of identification with the in-group of the people. Thereby, we develop 
a theoretical framework that relies on a large body of studies dedicated to social identity the-
ory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), false consensus (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and hostile me-
dia perceptions (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). Moreover, we will also draw on previous 
research devoted to populist communication (e.g., Reinemann, Aalberg, Esser, Strömbäck, & 
Vreese, 2017), which is discussed as the provider of cues regarding the specific understanding 
of the in-group and out-group(s).  
With this approach, we aim to integrate the investigation of populist attitudes into re-
search that is at the core of communication science. Interestingly, for example, our assump-
tions contrast findings regarding the persuasive press inference. While several studies show 
WE ARE THE PEOPLE AND YOU ARE FAKE NEWS  5 
that public opinion is often inferred from media tone perceptions as a function of beliefs in 
media effects on others (cf., Gunther, 1998; Gunther & Chia, 2001), we argue below that this 
mechanism might not be applicable for populist citizens. We will use the social identity ap-
proach to populist attitudes to explain this potentially unique relationship between hostile me-
dia perceptions and false consensus beliefs in the case of populist citizens.  
Research on both false consensus and hostile media perceptions has identified a large 
number of critical consequences that these perceptions may have for liberal democracies. For 
example, hostile media perceptions relate to the unwillingness to accept democratic decisions 
(Tsfati & Cohen, 2005), increased minority alienation (Tsfati, 2007), decreased political par-
ticipation (Feldman, Hart, Leiserowitz, Maibach, & Roser-Renouf, 2015; Moy, Torres, 
Tanaka, & McCluskey, 2005), acceptance of incivility (Post, 2017), and corrective actions 
that may result in opinion polarization (Rojas, 2010). The most profound consequence of 
false consensus effects may be that members of groups that rely on false consensus have a 
stronger willingness to express their own opinions (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997; Mat-
thes, Knoll & Sikorski, 2018). This may make their group appear stronger in number than it 
actually is, which has respective implications for public opinion formation processes (Noelle-
Neumann, 1974). If hostile media and false consensus perceptions co-occur with populist atti-
tudes, their potential threat to liberal democracy could multiply. 
To address the two empirical aims mentioned above, we rely on survey data gathered 
in four European greater regions: Berlin, Zurich, Paris, and London, as well as their respec-
tive surrounding rural areas. Populist attitudes are treated as a predictor for opinion and media 
perceptions in a multi-group regression analysis. Our correlational findings demonstrate that 
the hypothesized perceptual pattern is stable in all four countries: as a person’s populist atti-
tudes strengthen, the public opinion climate is perceived to be more congruent with their own 
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opinion and the mass media’s tone is perceived to be more incongruent with their own opin-
ion. Moreover, we established evidence for a gap between hostile media and congruent public 
opinion perceptions that increases with increasing populist attitudes to the extent that the per-
suasive press inference mechanism is annulled for those with strong populist attitudes. The 
social identity framework for populist citizens’ perceptions of media and public opinion of-
fers ideas for underlying psychological mechanisms that could cause these perceptions. In the 
following, this approach will be introduced.  
A Social Identity Approach to Populism 
Researchers have argued that populism (Krämer, 2014; Reinemann et al., 2017), hos-
tile media perceptions (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013; Reid, 2012) and public opinion perceptions 
(e.g., Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, & Copper, 1992) are related to social categorization and so-
cial identity. Hence, social identity theory provides a fruitful framework within which links 
between populist attitudes, public opinion and media perceptions can be established. 
Social identity and self-categorization theories base their argument on the human need 
for a positive social identity (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; cf., Turner, 2000). 
Social identity accompanies personal identity as components of the human self-concept and 
defines the self as a member of different social groups. Within the process of social categori-
zation, individuals identify with different groups. If a specific group membership is made sa-
lient, the desire to achieve, maintain or enhance a positive value linked to this group member-
ship is triggered (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This process involves social comparisons that serve 
to identify in-group superiority over respective out-groups. Specifically, the salience of a 
group membership sets the individual’s perceptions to accentuate intragroup similarities re-
garding positive attributes that the in-group shares (in-group favoritism) and to emphasize in-
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tergroup differences regarding negative attributes that the out-group shares (out-group dis-
crimination) (Kelly, 1989; Rubin & Badea, 2007; Turner, 2000; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).  
Central to the process of social categorization is the mechanism of depersonalization. 
When following group prototypes, individuals no longer perceive people as distinctive indi-
viduals but as better or worse approximations of the group prototype. The perception of oth-
ers and the perception of the self are depersonalized. Depersonalization has a notable effect 
on the self, as it causes “thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and behavior to conform to [the] pro-
totype of the in-group” (Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 10). Salient social categorizations—the offer 
of social categories to which one can adhere—causes these social identity mechanisms to un-
roll. In the following, we will link insights from research on populism to the ideas of social 
identity theory to show that populism is just this kind of offer.  
Social Categories Established by Populism  
This article follows an ideational approach to populism that has been strongly applied 
in the fields of political science (e.g., van Kessel, 2015) and communication science (e.g., 
Aalberg, Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & Vreese, 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). According to 
this approach, populism is understood as a thin political ideology. This ideology understands 
society to be split into two homogeneous groups: the pure people and the corrupt elite. The 
former is assumed to be defrauded by the latter in that the latter does not follow the principle 
of popular sovereignty as the ideology indicates it should (Mudde, 2004). Populism can de-
velop into a thick ideology (e.g., right-wing or left-wing populism) as soon as full ideologies 
such as fascism or socialism are added to it (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).  
However, independent of how the ideology is enriched, the antagonistic relation be-
tween the people and the political elite always is a key element of populism. This is acknowl-
edged by different definitions of or operationalization approaches to populism (e.g., Canovan, 
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1981; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; March, 2017; Müller, 2016; Reinemann et al., 2017; Wey-
land, 2001). This distinction is also particularly relevant for the upcoming argument.  
The antagonism between the people and the elite is often illustrated by the phrase ‘us 
versus them’. Thereby, the ‘us’ stands for the pure people and the likeminded, such as the 
populist politician, i.e., the in-group. ‘Them’ refers to out-groups, most notably, the political 
elite currently running the government, but minorities such as immigrants or religious groups 
are also often named in this respect (e.g., Jagers & Walgrave, 2007; Wirth et al., 2016). The 
populist ideology thus sketches a very definite social structure that consists of merely two 
groups: one that is good and one that is bad (also “Manichean outlook” of populism; e.g., 
Mudde, 2004, p. 544). With that, populism follows a form of “identity politics” (Müller, 
2016, p. 3): It offers clear social categories along which self-categorization can unfold.  
For populism to exert this potential, its ideas must be publicly diffused. The means for 
this diffusion is populist communication, which is employed mainly by populist political ac-
tors (e.g., Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017) but also occurs within media 
coverage (Krämer, 2014). Populist communication is defined as a set of features or elements 
of communicative messages that resonate with the populist ideology. Its core messages are 
therefore related to the people, to the political elite, and to popular sovereignty (March, 2017; 
Reinemann et al., 2017; Wirth et al., 2016). They directly mirror the thin definition of the 
populist ideology and together promote the populist division of society: the social categories 
of the good people and the evil political elite. As populism is defined to be adaptable to other 
concepts, we argue that populist communication must also be addressed as an extendable con-
cept. For example, in order to describe more distinguished shapes of populism, it might seem 
useful to regard exclusionist messages (cf., Reinemann et al., 2017, p. 24), opinion majority 
claims (cf., Taggart, 2000), and anti-media rhetoric (cf., Krämer, forthcoming) as additional 
elements of populist communication. This idea will be further addressed below.  
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Populist Attitudes and the Identification to the In-Group of the People 
Citizens who support the core ideas of populism are identified as those who hold pop-
ulist attitudes (Akkerman et al., 2014). More specifically, they hold anti-elitist attitudes, be-
lieve in a homogeneous and virtuous people and show a high demand for popular sovereignty 
(Schulz et al., 2017). They have internalized the Manichean divide of society that is promoted 
within populism and self-categorize as group members of the people. Accordingly, they view 
the political elite as malicious and the people as a virtuous unity and feel that they belong to 
the latter. Prior research has shown that populist attitudes can be reinforced by the core mes-
sages of populist communication (Müller et al., 2017). Moreover, repeated exposure to media 
representations of the societal divide promoted by populism is argued to trigger identification 
with the in-group of the people and foster the “development of schema-based in-group or out-
group bias in the perception and evaluation of social phenomena” (Krämer, 2014, p. 55). 
To date, the literature on populism still lacks a profound discussion of the potential 
consequences of identification to the in-group of the people—that is, to what degree this spe-
cific identification can stimulate generalized attitudes, biased perceptions or comprehensive 
categorizations regarding diverse societal entities. In this context, several authors have re-
ferred to the term “populist worldview” or have described populism as a “mental map” to ex-
press the idea that populist attitudes do not come alone but their internalization by the individ-
ual has consequences for the perception and comprehension of political and social reality (El-
chardus & Spruyt, 2016; Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2015; Hawkins, 2010; Krämer, 2014; 
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015).  
By tracing populist citizens’ perceptions of public opinion and the media, we will in-
vestigate elements of this populist worldview in greater detail. We argue that false consensus 
and perceptions of a hostile media follow group psychological mechanisms triggered by an 
identification to the people. Moreover, populist communication is argued to specify in-group 
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and out-group prototypes. Specifically, opinion majority claims and anti-media rhetoric em-
ployed by populist leaders are discussed to accentuate in-group and out-group characteristics. 
Drawing on the approaches of false consensus and the hostile media effect we outline below 
how the interplay of populist cues and in-group identification with the people makes way for 
these biased perceptions to unfold.  
We Are the People! Populist Attitudes and False Consensus Perceptions  
The concept of the people is central to populism (Taggart, 2000). According to the 
populist ideology, the people is a homogeneous and virtuous group, a coherent entity of a 
generally good character that shares the same values and interests (Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 
2016). By defining the people as such, populism constructs a homogeneous in-group to which 
individuals can adhere. However, this alone does not explain why individuals who identify 
with the group of the people should project their own opinion onto the whole population and 
believe that their opinion has a majority status, as anecdotal evidence currently suggests.  
Definition of the in-group in populism. We argue that opinion majority claims, as an 
additional feature of populist communication, contribute to this perceptual bias. In general, an 
in-group’s self-understanding is promoted by prototypical in-group members (Hogg & Reid, 
2006; Mols, 2012; Reicher & Hopkins, 1996). To populism, these are the “charismatic lead-
ers” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 5). In their reference to the people, they spread an un-
derstanding of the people as being virtuous and homogeneous. This claim to people-centrism 
has been identified as a fundamental element of populist communication (Bos, van der Brug, 
& Vreese, 2010; Reinemann et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2014; Wirth et al., 2016).  
However, the populist narrative is not limited to this message alone. The populist actor 
further defines the people as a “silent majority” (cf., Taggart, 2000, p. 92) whose opinions are 
not heard but suppressed by the ruling political elite. We argue that these majority cues to a 
more fine-grained self-understanding of the people are easily internalized by those who have 
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identified as in-group members of the people. This argument is supported by the notion that 
individuals “learn their biases” from role models (Wilder, 1986, p. 292). Indeed, the identifi-
cation with a group increases the persuasiveness of attitudes or group norms promoted by in-
group leaders. A reason for this is the individual motivation to accord behavior and attitudes 
with those of other, especially prototypical, in-group members through the process of deper-
sonalization (Hogg & Reid, 2006). Therefore, if a person self-categorizes as a member of the 
people, he or she should be more likely to adopt populist opinion majority claims and accord-
ingly believe in the numerical superiority of the own group.  
False consensus as a response to in-group threat. In general, research has shown 
that individuals very quickly overrate congruency of their own opinions with a majority (see 
research on false consensus, e.g., Ross et al., 1977; projection hypothesis, e.g., Holmes, 1968; 
looking glass perception, e.g., Fields & Schuman, 1976). This distortion has a functional 
value for the individual in that humans generally like to be right (Festinger, 1954). Certainty 
regarding the correctness of one’s own attitudes increases when they are seen to be shared by 
others (Holtz & Miller, 1985). False consensus is therefore a means by which “one can be re-
assured of the normality and appropriateness of one’s positions” (Hoorens, 1993, p. 130). 
While humans generally tend to believe that others share their views, different circum-
stances have been identified under which this bias is even more likely to occur. For example, 
false consensus perceptions are elicited by attitude strength (Wojcieszak & Price, 2009) or by 
low perceived in-group status. Regarding the latter, members of groups with minority status 
regard themselves as being in the unbearable position of their opinions being under attack by 
stronger out-groups. In this situation, false consensus helps members of low-status groups to 
self-enhance: it fosters the feeling of in-group strength and allows group members to under-
stand themselves as part of a cohesive social whole (see also in-group homogeneity effect; 
Kelly, 1989; Lee & Ottati, 1995). As a consequence, opinions held by the own group appear 
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more powerful to in-group members (Spears, van der Pligt, & Eiser, 1985). Finally, individu-
als who are part of minority groups also tend to overestimate consensus for their position out 
of a need for social support, while those with majority positions rather underestimate consen-
sus (Marks & Miller, 1987; Sanders & Mullen, 1983).  
According to the populist narrative, the people is also a group under threat by the evil 
political elite in that it is constantly suppressed with no access to power. In comparison to the 
political elite, the people’s group status is thus low on the dimension of power. Furthermore, 
many opinions held by populist actors and parties, for instance those regarding issues such as 
migration or homosexuality, are often delegitimized as being immoral, reactionary, politically 
incorrect, or extreme by other actors in the public debate (Herkman, 2015; Koopmans & 
Muis, 2009; Taggart, 2002). Therefore, there is no doubt that populist standpoints are under 
attack. Moreover, research on populist attitudes shows that populist citizens hold high levels 
of collective relative deprivation (Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016; Hameleers et al., 2017b). This 
feeling results from the perception of belonging to a group with low status. Against this back-
ground, individuals who have strongly internalized this vision of the people could be prone to 
projecting their own opinion onto others in order to strengthen their in-group’s status and 
confirm their impression of having legitimate yet suppressed positions.  
Accordingly, the in-group of the people fits a precondition of false consensus percep-
tions regarding the feeling of being under threat. Thus, in addition to the influence of populist 
majority claims, these psychological mechanisms also likely have the potential to explain 
false consensus perceptions by populist citizens. We thus formally hypothesize the following:  
H1: As a person’s populist attitudes become stronger, he or she becomes more likely 
to perceive public opinion as congruent with his or her own standpoint.  
You Are Fake News! Populist Attitudes and Hostile Media Perceptions  
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The relevant out-group to thin populism is the political elite, that is, the politicians 
currently running the government. Whether on national or supranational level, the political 
elite is blamed for all types of problems and—most of all—is blamed for depriving the people 
in that they ignore its will. However, depending on the specific form of populism, other socie-
tal actors with an elitist status are also construed as a burden to the people. For instance, intel-
lectuals, administrations (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007), or, as predominant within left-wing pop-
ulism, the wealthy (Wirz, 2018) are often defined to be accomplices of the establishment poli-
ticians. Another actor against whom populist actors vent their anger on is the mass media. 
Donald Trump’s reproach to CNN, calling the outlet ‘fake news’, can serve as a primary ex-
ample of hostile media attitudes expressed by a populist actor (Jamieson, 2017). In the fol-
lowing, we will discuss how accusations such as these can contribute to a perception of the 
mass media as being an out-group to the people. Afterwards, we will rely on research devoted 
to the hostile media effect and discuss how these elite cues on media bias may facilitate self-
categorization processes that further pave the way toward hostile media perceptions. 
Definition of the out-group in populism. The attribution of blame to elites is another 
core element of populist communication (Hameleers, Bos & de Vreese, 2017a, 2017c). 
Judged from a self-categorization perspective, this delineation of out-groups is central to the 
definition of the in-group (Turner et al., 1987). Moreover, contrasts between in-group and 
out-groups are emphasized when out-groups are depersonalized and seen as homogeneous 
(Wilder, 1984). For populist communication to be successful, the creation of despicable out-
groups is thus as important as the accentuation of appealing features of the in-group.  
The mainstream media are not randomly chosen by the populist leader as an opponent 
to the people. Theoretical work on populism offers clear ideas on where the mainstream me-
dia stand within populisms’ relational network. The mainstream media can be understood as a 
specific interpretation of the elite (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007) and specifically, as a conspiring 
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agent of the established politicians (Mazzoleni, 2003). The media are blamed for biased re-
porting in favor of the political elite and are reproached for not fulfilling their democratic 
function as the Fourth Estate. This perspective on the media—in which they are considered a 
part of an elite conspiracy—has been coined “anti-media populism” (Krämer, forthcoming).  
To the best of our knowledge, only two empirical studies to date investigate anti-me-
dia populism on the content level. In an analysis of Belgian political parties’ broadcasts, Ja-
gers and Walgrave showed that only the “all-out populist party” (2007, p. 331), Vlaams Blok, 
led an anti-media discourse, whereas other parties did not engage in such criticism. Addition-
ally, Holt (2016) recorded representatives from Swedish alternative media expressing the 
deep conviction that the mainstream media lie and have joined forces with the elite.  
With messages of this type, populist actors declare the mainstream media to be a dan-
gerous out-group to the people. Importantly, this declaration is all-encompassing, as it in-
cludes all mainstream media, not only particular outlets. The media as an institution form a 
group from which one must dissociate in order to keep one’s own social identity positive. Au-
dience members who self-categorize as members of the people should easily internalize this 
additional message and understand it as a view that is generally held by the in-group (cf., 
Hogg & Reid, 2006). Accordingly, citizens with populist attitudes should categorize the me-
dia in general as part of their out-group. This categorization can have significant effects on 
how content spread by these media is perceived. Research devoted to the hostile media effect 
describes and investigates precisely such mechanisms. 
Hostile media perceptions as a response to in-group threat. According to this line 
of research, strong partisans tend to perceive media reports that address issues of personal im-
portance as hostile (Vallone et al., 1985). A self-categorization explanation for this effect was 
introduced by Reid (2012), who showed that hostile media perceptions occur only if partisan 
identities are salient and when the message source belongs to the out-group. This effect is 
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stronger as individuals’ identification with the in-group becomes stronger (Arpan & Raney, 
2003). In addition, low in-group status, especially if perceived as being illegitimate, was 
found to amplify hostile media perceptions (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013). Following this line of 
research, low status is already threatening per se, and accordingly, members of low-status 
groups are especially sensitive to any additional threat imposed, for example, by media cover-
age. Hostile media perceptions are also reinforced by individuals’ belief in strong influences 
of media messages on others (Gunther & Storey, 2003). In the context of the hostile media 
effect, especially high-reach media are presumed to have the ability to shape public opinion in 
a direction that is favorable to the out-group, which would pose a clear threat to the status of 
the in-group (Hartmann & Tanis, 2013). 
Taken together, there are at least four reasons why populist citizens likely show hos-
tile media perceptions. First, anti-media rhetoric employed by populist actors declares the 
mainstream media to be an out-group to the people; this expression could serve as a cue to 
those who have internalized the populist ideology and turn them into highly skeptical con-
sumers of mainstream news. Second, the populist identity could be made salient as soon as a 
news item is devoted to mainstream political affairs, independent of particular political issues, 
because populism is directed against the political establishment in general. Individuals with 
strong populist attitudes should thus react very sensitively to any news content that features 
established political actors. Third, the perceived low political status of populist citizens could 
further prompt their perceptions of the mass media in a hostile direction. Hostile media per-
ceptions particularly result if the low in-group status is perceived to be illegitimate, which 
should be—as outlined above—the case among populist citizens. Fourth, the declared enemy 
of the people is high-reach media outlets what could increase the presumed influence of these 
media on others. The threat that these media pose should accordingly be perceived as quite 
momentous, and hence, hostile media perceptions should increase. 
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H2: As a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, he or she becomes more likely to per-
ceive the mainstream media’s reporting as incongruent with his or her own standpoint. 
The Gap between Perceived Media Tone and Public Opinion 
With the argument above, we postulate that as a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, 
that person will more strongly perceive public opinion to be congruent and the media to be 
incongruent with his or her own standpoint. In combination, both these predictions describe a 
gap between congruent public opinion perceptions and hostile media perceptions that should 
grow with increasing populist attitudes.  
The general perceptual pattern described by this gap is in line with findings presented 
by a series of studies on individual media and public opinion perceptions. It was demon-
strated several times that strong partisans show a strong positive relationship between their 
own opinion and perceived public opinion, which is explained by projection, as well as a 
strong negative relationship between their own opinion and perceived media opinion, which 
is explained by hostile media perceptions (e.g., Gunther & Chia, 2001; Gunther & Christen, 
2002; Gunther, Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001). In addition, these studies revealed a per-
suasive press inference, which describes the individual tendency to infer public opinion from 
the perceived media tone as a function of beliefs in media effects on others (Gunther, 1998). 
While the persuasive press inference did not disband the projection of one’s own opinion onto 
public opinion, it offset projection at least to some extent (cf., Gunther & Christen, 2002).  
As we suggest an increasing gap between perceived congruent public opinion on one 
hand and perceived incongruent media on the other, we also imply that the persuasive press 
inference might be weaker (if not annulled) among populist citizens. According to the social 
identity approach followed in this article, an explanation for this phenomenon could lie in 
populist citizens’ conception of the people as an in-group. This in-group is, following the 
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populist narrative, very homogeneous and positively charged, which could translate into ex-
ceptionally strong perceived communalities with the people among those that identify with 
this group. Correspondingly, research on presumed media effects on others has demonstrated 
a social distance corollary: as an individual perceives a group of others to be more similar to 
the self, this group will be perceived as less susceptible to media influences (cf. Duck, Hogg 
& Terry, 1995; Reid & Hogg, 2005; for a meta-analysis, see Sun, Pan, & Shen, 2008). More-
over, populism sketches the people as a very intelligent group that acts according to common 
sense (Taggart, 2000). Thus, individuals who regard the people as their in-group should be 
motivated to believe in weak media effects on this group as a function of perceived similari-
ties and because of the group’s intelligence, which should protect the group from simply be-
lieving the disinformation spread by the manipulative enemy. For these reasons, the persua-
sive press inference mechanism is likely weaker for populist citizens, which should lead the 
gap between hostile media and congruent public opinion perceptions to widen rather than to 
shrink. We therefore assume the following: 
H3: As a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, the difference between perceptions of 
congruent public opinion and of a hostile media increases.  
Finally, we would like to determine whether the proposed relations travel across bor-
ders—that is, if false consensus and hostile media perceptions can be connected to populist 
attitudes in different countries. This research question will be approached using cross-country 
comparisons between four metropolitan regions. Specifically, we will compare the relation of 
populist attitudes, media and opinion perceptions in Berlin, Zurich, London and Paris. If the 
social psychological mechanisms are at work as proposed above, populist citizens in the cho-
sen regions will likely classify public opinion and the mass media in the same ways, particu-
larly because populist communication was demonstrated to play an important and influential 
role in the mediated political discourse in these four countries (Müller et al., 2017).  
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RQ1: Do the proposed relationships between populist attitudes, public opinion percep-
tions and media perceptions reflect general perceptual patterns that are employed by populist 
citizens in different countries?  
Method 
Data  
This study is a secondary data analysis that relies mainly on the second wave of a two-
wave panel survey fielded in April 2014 (1st wave) and March 2015 (2nd wave). The survey 
was conducted by a market research institute, and respondents were recruited from an online 
access panel following a quota procedure regarding sex and age. Data were gathered in four 
European cities and their surrounding rural areas: Berlin and Brandenburg; Germany (N = 
640); Paris and Île-de-France, France (N = 640); Zurich and canton of Zurich, Switzerland (N 
= 1250); and London and Buckinghamshire, United Kingdom (N = 824). Complete data were 
obtained for 3,354 participants. Completion rates for the first panel wave range between 87.5 
percent (Paris) and 92.8 percent (Switzerland). Due to panel mortality, which ranged between 
37% in Zurich and 60% in Paris, the empirical distributions of age and sex slightly deviate 
from population data (Berlin: Mage = 45.9, SD = 13.1, 55% female; Paris: Mage = 47.7, SD = 
13.1, 61.9% female; Zurich: Mage = 51.8, SD = 13.8, 47.2% female; London: Mage = 51.5, SD 
= 13.2, 41.6% female). Thus, influences of age and sex were controlled for in all analyses.  
Measures 
Public opinion perceptions. Public opinion perceptions were measured via three 
items for which participants had to indicate how strongly they perceive their own opinion 
about a country’s politics to be shared by others. Items did not focus on opinions toward a 
specific policy or person but asked for opinions regarding a country’s politics in general. This 
approach was chosen because the populist ideology does not blame the political elite for a 
failure regarding a specific political issue but expresses a general criticism of all politics run 
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by the political elite. Values ranged from 1 (do not agree at all) to 5 (agree completely). 
Thus, high scores indicate that a person believes public opinion to correspond to personal 
views regarding a country’s politics in general, whereas a low score indicates the opposite. 
The items were sufficiently reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .84), allowing for the computation 
of a mean index. This index was normally distributed in all four country subsets (MBerlin = 
3.17; SD = 0.82; MParis = 3.18; SD = 0.89; MZurich = 2.99; SD = 0.79; MLondon = 3.15; SD = 
0.84; see Table A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix for a complete measurement report).  
Media perceptions. The perceptions of the degree of congruency or incongruence be-
tween the mainstream media’s reporting and one’s own opinion was measured via 4 items 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The measurement was taken from 
Matthes (2012, see also Eveland & Shah, 2003; Hwang, Pan, & Sun, 2008) and adapted to the 
context of our study. Parallel to how the public opinion measurement was established, we 
asked for an overall evaluation of the media coverage regarding a country’s politics and not 
regarding specific issues. Importantly, the measurement tapped for opinion hostile media per-
ceptions including the ego-perspective, which enables us to directly detect whether our re-
spondents feel that the media are on their side (i.e., support their own opinion) or not. The 
measures are thus very adequate for the social identity approach to populist attitudes and pop-
ulist perceptions that we follow within this article. The four items were consistent to a satis-
factory degree (Cronbach’s Alpha = .84), and a mean index was computed. To simplify the 
interpretation of the results, we reversed the index so that high values yield a congruent media 
perception (as high values on the public opinion perception measure also indicate opinion 
congruent perceptions) and low values indicate incongruent media perceptions (MBerlin = 2.64; 
SD = 0.89; MParis = 2.50; SD = 0.73; MZurich = 2.94; SD = 0.84; MLondon = 2.57; SD = 0.79; see 
Table A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix for a complete measurement report).  
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Perceptual gap. To depict the perceptual gap between media perceptions and public 
opinion perceptions, we computed a third dependent variable as a difference score for public 
opinion perceptions and media perceptions. Media perception scores were subtracted from 
public opinion perception scores. As both original variables ranged from 1 to 5, values of the 
gap variable range from -4 to +4. A score of -4 occurs if a person perceives public opinion to 
strongly diverge from the personal view (score of 1 on the public opinion variable) and if that 
person simultaneously perceives the media to report very much in line with his or her per-
sonal view (score of 5 on the media perception variable). A score of +4 occurs if a person per-
ceives public opinion to correspond to the personal view (score of 5 for the public opinion 
variable) and if that person simultaneously perceives the media to report very incongruently 
with his or her personal view (score of 1 for the media perception variable). In both cases, the 
difference in perceptions of the media and public opinion will be at its maximum. Coming 
from both ends of the scale, the perceptual gap decreases toward the scale midpoint of 0. A 
score of 0 indicates that a person does not perceive a difference between how media reporting 
leans and how public opinion leans with reference to his or her own opinion. (MBerlin = 0.53; 
SD=1.35; MParis = 0.69; SD = 1.25; MZurich = 0.05; SD = 1.2; MLondon = 0.57; SD = 1.21). 
Populist attitudes. Populist attitudes were measured using a 12-item scale that was 
introduced by Schulz et al. (2017). In sets of four items, the scale depicts three facets of popu-
list attitudes: anti-establishment, popular sovereignty, and the homogeneity and virtuousness 
of the people. Survey participants rated all items using 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), which are reflected by a higher-order factor of pop-
ulist attitudes. The z-scores of that higher-order factor were used for the analyses (see Table 
A1 and A2 in the Online Appendix for a complete measurement report).  
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Controls. We included political orientation, political extremity, political interest, age, 
sex, and education as controls in our analyses. In the countries under investigation, the strong-
est populist force comes from the right of the political spectrum, with the Alternative for Ger-
many in Germany, the Front National in France, the Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland and 
the UK Independence Party in Great Britain (van Kessel, 2015). We therefore expect right-
wing political orientation, measured via a single item scaled from 1 (left) to 11 (right), to bet-
ter relate to our outcome variables than left-wing political orientation. Furthermore, as re-
search has shown that strong attitudes or involvement enhance false consensus (Wojcieszak 
& Price, 2009) and hostile media effects (Vallone et al., 1985), we included political extrem-
ity as a control to rule out the possibility that relationships between populist attitudes and our 
dependent variables are due only to strong populist attitudes. To investigate the role of politi-
cal extremity, we recoded the political orientation measure so that its outer ends now indicate 
political extremity (value 6), while its former midpoint now represents moderate political atti-
tudes (value 1). Additionally, political interest could function as involvement and reinforce 
both hostile media perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions. Hence, this varia-
ble, measured via a single item from 1 (not at all interested) to 5 (very interested) was also 
inserted. These controls, as well as age, sex, and education, were added to all models in order 
to assess the relative strength of the relationship between populist attitudes and the respective 
outcome variables and to control for bias due to samples that are not fully representative (see 
Table A2 in the Online Appendix for a complete measurement report and Table A3 for bivari-
ate correlations between all variables).  
Analyses  
First, we conducted a principle axis factor analysis (PAF) to check whether populist 
attitudes can be empirically distinguished from public opinion and media perceptions. Sec-
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ond, we run three multi-group regression analyses using the 1.1-12 version of the lmr4-pack-
age for R, which can be used to fit linear mixed-effects models (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015). The three different outcome variables were regressed onto the same predictor 
variables within varying-intercept models (Gelman & Hill, 2009). Slopes were fixed to take 
into account that respondents are nested within different countries. To determine whether the 
proposed relations are equal in the regions under investigation, we freed the slopes for popu-
list attitudes and compared this model to the varying-intercept model.  
Results 
Within a preparatory analysis 19 items (3 on opinion perceptions, 4 on media percep-
tions, and 12 measuring populist attitudes) were entered into a PAF using the promax rotation 
method. The analysis clearly demonstrates that the relevant constructs are empirically distinct 
both across and within the separate regions (see Table A1 in the Online Appendix).  
The first multi-group regression is run with public opinion perceptions as an outcome 
in order to test for H1. The results are summarized in Table 1. Populist attitudes are signifi-
cantly—and in this case, positively—related to congruent public opinion perceptions (β = .31; 
p < .001). Accordingly, as a person holds stronger populist attitudes, that person will more 
strongly perceive public opinion to be in line with his or her own opinion. This result con-
firms H1. In addition, political orientation, education, and sex are found to significantly relate 
to public opinion perceptions. The results show that congruent public opinion perceptions are 
also explained by female sex (β = -.05; p < .001), low education (β = -.07; p < .001) and, to a 
comparably strong degree, by right-wing political orientation (β = .24; p < .001). As a person 
leans more strongly toward the political right, that person will more strongly perceive public 
opinion to be congruent with his or her own opinion.  
[Table 1 here] 
WE ARE THE PEOPLE AND YOU ARE FAKE NEWS  23 
Our second hypothesis stated that populist citizens perceive the media reporting to be 
hostile toward their own opinion. Table 1 shows that this hypothesis is confirmed. We find a 
strong negative and significant relation between populist attitudes and media perceptions. 
That is, as a person holds stronger populist attitudes, that person will perceive the media to be 
less congruent (β = -.32; p < .001). Political interest (β = -.04; p < .05) and political orienta-
tion (β = -.04; p < .05) also proved to be significant predictors of media perceptions.  
Our final hypothesis investigated the gap variable, that is, the difference score be-
tween media perceptions and opinion perceptions as an outcome. The hypothesis said that the 
difference in perceiving the media as incongruent toward one’s own standpoint and perceiv-
ing public opinion to be congruent to one’s own standpoint is greatest for those with strong 
populist attitudes. The results are summarized in Table 1. This hypothesis is also confirmed, 
with populist attitudes being the strongest predictor for the gap variable (β = .41; p < .001). 
As a person more strongly supports populist ideas, his or her evaluations of media and public 
opinion will diverge more. Thus, to very populist citizens, these two entities are considered to 
be in strong opposition.1 After populist attitudes, political orientation is again the second 
                                                 
1 The results presented so far point to the question of whether populist citizens still in-
fer public opinion from their perceived media tone perceptions, as presumed by research on 
the persuasive press inference (cf. Gunther & Chia, 2001). If social identity mechanisms drive 
hostile media tone perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions, then maybe the per-
suasive press inference is switched off among populist citizens. In order to offer a test for this 
particular question, we run a mediation analysis. The analysis confirms the results of H1 and 
H2 and shows no significant relation between media perceptions and public opinion percep-
tions. This finding indicates that indeed, populist citizens do not seem to make persuasive 
press inferences (see Online Appendix Table A4 for detailed results).  
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strongest predictor included in this analysis (β = .18; p < .001). Furthermore, low education (β 
= -.05; p < .01) and stronger political interest (β = .05; p < .01) are related to the gap as well.  
For all three outcome variables, we find that populist attitudes are the strongest predic-
tor.2 As a person more strongly supports populist ideas, he or she more strongly perceives the 
media’s reporting as hostile toward his or her personal standpoint and more strongly per-
ceives the public opinion to be in line with his or her own standpoint. Following populist atti-
tudes, right-wing political orientation holds the next greatest share of explained variance for 
media perceptions, public opinion perceptions, and the gap. This can be connected to the 
dominance of right-wing populist forces in the regions under investigation (van Kessel, 
2015). However, it is remarkable that populist attitudes, which represent only the core of the 
populist ideology and depict no tendency toward either the political left or the political right, 
explain the greatest share of variance in public opinion and media perceptions. To ascertain 
whether the observed relationships are not caused merely by populist citizens’ strong atti-
tudes, political extremity was included as a control. Yet, political extremity did not relate to 
any of the three outcome variables (Table 1).3  
                                                 
2 This remains true if we use indicators for populist attitudes that no longer contain the 
dimension that is most conceptually similar to the respective outcome. For the first model, we 
omitted anti-elitist attitudes so that only the homogeneity and the popular sovereignty dimen-
sions account for variance in media perceptions. For the second model, we excluded the ho-
mogeneity dimension so that only anti-establishment and popular sovereignty were linked to 
public opinion perceptions. In both cases, the results remain almost completely equal. Most 
importantly, the coefficients for populist attitudes remain by far the strongest by comparison.  
3 To better evaluate the influence of political extremity we run all models including 
political extremity but excluding populist attitudes. The results show that political extremity 
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Finally, we freed the slopes for populist attitudes in the model that uses the gap varia-
ble as an outcome to determine whether the detected perceptual patterns are equal in all four 
regions under investigation (RQ 1). The results show that random effects for populist atti-
tudes are very similar in strength and range between 1.12 in Paris to 1.37 in Berlin. Thus, 
populist attitudes remain the strongest predictor for the gap variable in all four country sam-
ples. The comparison of the varying-intercept model with the varying-intercept varying-slope 
model via Akaike’s information criterion reveals no notable changes (Table 1).4 Hence, we 
find the detected populist perceptual patterns are parallel in the four regions.  
Discussion 
Across Europe, populist parties are gaining influence. Their supporters have filled the 
streets and online comment forums, claiming to hold majority status and behaving in a hostile 
fashion—in words and actions—toward politicians and the media. So far, no studies have in-
vestigated whether these observations are systematic, that is, whether anti-media attitudes and 
opinion majority beliefs can be empirically linked to populist attitudes. This study set out to 
provide an extensive theoretical framework and empirical evidence of a relationship between 
populist attitudes, false consensus and hostile media perceptions in four countries.  
We find clear systematic patterns. First, as a person’s populist attitudes strengthen, he 
or she is more likely to sense a similarity between his or her own opinion and public opinion. 
Second, a person’s perceptions of the media turn increasingly hostile as his or her populist at-
titudes strengthen. Moreover, the difference in perceiving public opinion to be congruent with 
                                                 
exerts a significant influence on hostile media perceptions when populist attitudes are ex-
cluded (b = -0.02; t(3354) = -2.28; p <.05) but still political extremity does not relate to the 
other two outcome variables (see also the bivariate correlations in Table A3).  
4 This is also the case for model comparisons of the other two models.  
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one’s own standpoint and perceiving the media to be hostile increases with increasing popu-
list attitudes. This pattern was demonstrated in all four country samples.  
These results and the social identity framework for populist attitudes developed in this 
article can help us to better understand populist citizens and the social dynamics connected to 
populism and populist communication. As noted by Rooduijn (2017), the extant literature on 
populist attitudes lacks evidence about commonalities among populist citizens since most 
studies have been set in single countries and have focused on either left- or right-wing popu-
list attitudes. By applying a measurement for populist attitudes that traces support to the thin 
ideology of populism and that links this measure to media and public opinion perceptions in 
four countries, we demonstrated that hostile media perceptions and false consensus percep-
tions are unifying characteristics of populist citizens. These perceptions are potentially driven 
by social identity mechanisms, as suggested by our theoretical analysis.  
Additionally, our findings contribute to basic communication research. As shown by 
our analysis, the persuasive press inference mechanism seems to be annulled if hostile media 
perceptions and congruent public opinion perceptions are each driven by populist attitudes. 
We argued that this finding might be connected to the fact that the people, who constitute 
public opinion, are conceived of as the in-group by populist citizens and the in-group is seen 
as less susceptible to media messages (cf. Reid & Hogg, 2005). However, this finding does 
not imply that populist citizens do not generally make persuasive press inferences. Con-
versely, populist citizens might well infer opinions of others from perceived mediated opin-
ions, but only if those others are not the people (i.e., the in-group). Clearly, further research is 
needed to learn more about populist citizens’ beliefs in media effects on others.  
Limitations and Future Research 
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Naturally, this study has limitations, and the findings must be read in light of these 
shortcomings. First, the social identity mechanisms that were proposed to underlie the ob-
served relations were not tested in this study. Future research should gather empirical infor-
mation about populist communication that refers to the people as the majority or to the media 
as agents of the political elite. Media effects studies should test how such messages affect cit-
izens’ public opinion and media perceptions through the process of in-group identification. 
As long as these avenues are not pursued, the social identity approach to populist attitudes 
and its consequences as outlined herein will remain only a possible explanation for the identi-
fied perceptual patterns. Furthermore, for this exploration, we had to rely on cross-sectional 
data and no question of causality can hence be approached. Future research will have to fol-
low up on the ideas presented in this article with either longitudinal or experimental designs 
in order to detect eventual causalities between populist attitudes, hostile media and false con-
sensus perceptions, as well as the relationships between these factors and their assumed pre-
dictors: exposure to populist communication and identification with the people.  
Moreover, clarification is needed regarding the psychological foundations of demand-
side populism. Within this article, we have inter alia referred to this as a mental map or 
worldview without fully resolving what these concepts are psychologically. We assume 
that—in the broadest sense—the populist worldview serves as a cognitive and affective 
framework that influences how incoming information about different societal entities is pro-
cessed. This study has identified hostile media perceptions and opinion majority beliefs as el-
ements of this worldview, however, further conceptual efforts are needed to carve out the 
concepts specificities and borders.  
Further limitations concern our sample. The survey was run in four Western European 
regions. In all these countries, populism is strongly linked to the political right. The observed 
patterns should therefore also be investigated in countries where the dominant populist force 
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comes from the political left. If the concept of thin populism has empirical value, populist cit-
izens should show the same perceptual patterns, regardless of the political context in which 
they live. The fact that the proposed relationships were found to be similar in all four country 
samples while controlling for political orientation can be interpreted as a first indicator of 
their general significance. It also has to be acknowledged that the sample is not fully repre-
sentative. Respondents were recruited from online access panels, preventing those who do not 
have Internet access from participating. Moreover, we used data from the second wave of a 
panel survey, and dropouts from the first wave are likely systematic. However, we found the 
distributions of age and sex to remain close to population data, and we controlled for them 
and other relevant variables in all the analyses. At last, we have data from four metropolitan 
areas rather than national data. While we can argue that respondents’ backgrounds are diverse 
because we have surveyed both city districts and surrounding rural districts, metropolitan ar-
eas should not be regarded as petri dishes for nation states. Rather, we can assume that polari-
zation crystallizes in these regions. It should be recognized that the relations discovered 
herein might differ in contexts characterized by consensus rather than polarization.  
Finally, we did not focus on citizens with low populist attitudes. However, our find-
ings should motivate future research to investigate this group as well. Most intriguing might 
be the question of whether the mediated populist schema also triggers self-categorization pro-
cesses among non-populist citizens. It could be possible that these citizens also start to em-
ploy the ‘us versus them’ frame and view those who support populism as members of an out-
group. This thought is supported by Müller et al. (2017), who found reactance effects among 
non-populist citizens when their media diet was saturated with populist messages. That popu-
list supporters are often stigmatized as angry and uneducated can count as anecdotal evidence 
for out-group hostility following self-categorization as a non-populist citizen.  
Conclusion 
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Despite its limitations, the present study contributes to an improved understanding of 
populist citizens in three ways. First, this study is the first to demonstrate a systematic link 
between populist attitudes, congruent public opinion perceptions, hostile media perceptions, 
and the distance between the two latter. Populist attitudes proved to be the strongest predictor 
compared to a series of control variables, such as political orientation or political extremity. 
Second, these perceptual patterns were found in four metropolitan areas, which indicates that 
they are not linked to a country-specific discourse but might rather be part of a general popu-
list attitude syndrome. Third, the article introduced a social identity approach to populist atti-
tudes, which proved to be a useful explanatory framework for populist citizens’ false consen-
sus and hostile media perceptions.  
Overall, we described a dangerous interplay between citizens’ identification to the in-
group of the people and their respective responses to populist claims and mechanisms, as de-
scribed by research on false consensus and hostile media effects. The societal consequences 
of these biased perceptions still deserve discussion and further investigation. The populist 
mistrust in the mainstream news media in terms of the ability to report fairly and accurately 
about politics is likely followed by a turn toward alternative media (Downey & Fenton, 2003; 
Tsfati & Peri, 2006) and a growing distrust in democracy as a whole (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005). 
Importantly, whereas media skepticism has always been linked to reporting about specific is-
sues or conflicts, it has become a general accusation among populist citizens. Accordingly, 
political arguments for different positions will hardly be listened to by populist citizens, 
which may challenge an inclusive democratic discourse (cf., Sunstein, 2002).  
The false consensus that was demonstrated among populist citizens likely leads these 
individuals to overestimate their status in society. This can have great value for minorities, 
who can increase their influence via this mechanism (cf., van Avermaet, Mugny, & Mosco-
vici, 1985). By projecting their own opinion onto others, populist citizens gain the impression 
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of large social support for their opinions, which also lends reassurance regarding their posi-
tion’s appropriateness. One of the most important sources that could correct this belief—the 
mass media—is disqualified as a lying agent of the disdained political elite.  
Given the growing success of populist parties in almost all modern democracies com-
bined with outrage against political and media elites, further research in this domain is highly 
important. More specifically, the dynamics of a potentially reinforcing spiral between popu-
list attitudes, false consensus and hostile media perceptions should be explored in more detail. 
A deeper analysis will enable researchers and practitioners in the domains of media and poli-
tics to develop a better understanding of how populist citizens make sense of the world. Ulti-
mately, this insight should help to develop measures that prevent further societal polarization 
in populist and anti-populist camps.  
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Table 1 
Fixed and Random Effects for Media Perceptions, Opinion Perceptions and the Gap Variable 
 Media Perceptions Opinion Perceptions Gap Gap 
  β b SE t β b SE t β b SE t β b SE t 
Fixed effects                 
Intercept  -.05 2.98 .13 22.64 .03 2.81 .10 28.48 .06 -0.18 .19 -0.92 .06 -0.17 .19 -0.88 
Age -.02 0.00 .00 -1.30 -.01 -0.00 .00 -0.46 .01 0.00 .00 0.64 .01 0.00 .00 0.63 
Sex (male) -.02 -0.03 .03 -0.94 -.05 -0.09 .03 -3.28 -.02 -0.06 .04 -1.59 -.02 -0.06 .04 -1.57 
Education (high) .00 -0.01 .03 -0.27 -.07 -0.12 .03 -4.50 -.05 -0.11 .04 -2.91 -.04 -0.11 .04 -2.89 
Political Interest -.04 -0.03 .01 -2.22 .03 0.02 .01 1.79 .05 0.06 .02 2.85 .05 0.05 .02 2.76 
Political Orientation (r.) -.04 -0.01 .01 -2.35 .24 0.08 .01 15.17 .18 0.10 .01 12.18 .18 0.10 .01 12.14 
Political Extremity -.02 -0.01 .01 -1.49 -.01 -0.01 .01 -0.69 .01 0.01 .01 0.59 .01 0.01 .01 0.52 
Populist Attitudes -.32 -0.63 .03 -19.13 .31 0.62 .03 19.53 .41 1.26 .05 27.21 .41 1.25 .08 15.22 
Random intercepts                 
Berlin -.10 2.95   .15 2.91   .17 -0.04   .17 -0.03   
Paris -.25 2.82   .06 2.83   .21 0.01   .21 0.02   
Zürich  .30 3.28   -.16 2.65   -.31 -0.64   -.31 -0.63   
London  -.16 2.90   .08 2.85   .16 -0.05   .16 -0.04   
Random effects for 
populist attitudes                 
Berlin             .51 1.37   
Paris             .31 1.12   
Zurich             .46 1.32   
London             .36 1.19   
R2 adj.  .17 .22 .30 .30 
AIC   10072.95 10073.48 
Note. N = 3,354 for all models; Effects significant at p < .05 are in boldface.  
 
